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Hyke Hasratian, by and through his counsel of record, David J.
Holdsworth, files this Reply Brief and explains and argues as follows:
The parties do not disagree substantially on the issues the instant appeal
presents for review, the applicable standards of review, the underlying facts of the
dispute and the procedural history of the instant case. The parties do disagree on the
application of the law to those facts, particularly as to whether substantial evidence
exists that the Department met its burden of proving administrative fraud under Utah
Code Annotated § 35A-4-405 (5) by clear and convincing evidence.
I.
THE CLAIMANT RECEIVED A PAYMENT IN THE
FORM OF CONTINUATION OF WAGES FOR ONE WEEK. HIS
EMPLOYER DIDN'T CONSIDER SUCH A PAYMENT TO BE SEVERANCE
PAY AND NEITHER DID THE CLAIMANT.
There is no question that after Mr. Hasratian was fired and he opened
his claim for unemployment insurance benefits, Mr. Hasratian's employer agreed to
continue to pay Mr. Hasratian his wages for the week of January 22 to 29, 2011. As
such, Mr. Hasratian does not dispute that such a payment made him ineligible for
waiting week credit for that week or an unemployment benefit payment for that week.
Accordingly, Mr. Hasratian does not dispute that he was overpaid for that one week
and has the obligation to pay that money back. See, generally, Utah Administrative
Code Rules 994-405-701 and 702. The issue is whether he fraudulently obtained
waiting week credit or unemployment insurance benefits for that one week, within the
1
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meaning of Utah Code Annotated § 35A-4-405 (5) and Utah Administrative Code
Rule 994-406-401.
The Department had the burden to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the payment of continuing wages which Mr. Hasratian's employer paid
Mr. Hasratian for one additional week was payment of severance pay and that Mr.
Hasratian knew or should have known it was a payment of severance pay and
knowingly or wilfully failed to reconnect with the Department to report it. This the
Department failed to show.
In making its argument that Mr. Hasratian received a separation
payment and by not disclosing such, fraudulently obtained unemployment benefits,
the Department commits a logical fallacy. It argues that it is "commonly understood"
that the type of continuation of wage payment Mr. Hasratian's employer eventually
agreed to pay him (for one week) and did pay him was payment of severance pay.
(Respondent's brief at page 8.)
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Department had met its burden of
proof in proving that the mass of unemployment claimants would commonly
understand the type of continuation of wage payment at issue in this case to be a
payment of severance pay (and the Department produces no evidence of this

2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

assertion, other than a definition from a dictionary which doesn't even apply1), the
issue is not what the mass of unemployment claimants might commonly understand, it
is what this claimant understood the payment of continuing wages for one more week
to be. A standard of clear and convincing evidence must mean that fraud may not be
presumed. Utah Administrative Code Rule 994-406-402 (2). It doesn't matter that
most or even many claimants might have understood this continuation of wages for
one more week to be a payment of severance pay. What matters is what Mr.
Hasratian understood. And Mr. Hasratian's testimony, which the Department did not
refute, was that Mr. Hasratian viewed his employer's decision to continue paying him
his wages for one more week as a simple courtesy with no strings attached and not as
payment of severance pay. R. at 102. The propositions that Mr. Hasratian knew that
such a payment was severance pay as defined by Utah Administrative Code Rule 994405-702 (3) and that he deliberately withheld reporting such payment of severance
pay are not supported by substantial evidence.
II.
THE CLAIMANT DID NOT KNOWINGLY OR
WILFULLY FAIL TO REPORT TO THE DEPARTMENT THAT HE HAD

*If severance pay is money which an employer pays to an employee "ordered to
give up a job," this payment would not qualify as severance pay. Mr. Hasratian's
employer had already fired Mr. Hasratian. Until Mr. Hasratian raised the subject of some
sort of severance arrangement, the employer hadn't offered or agreed to pay Mr.
Hasratian anything. He didn't agree to pay any severance pay to Mr. Hasratian. He
rejected that option completely.
3
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RECEIVED OR WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE A SEVERANCE
PAYMENT.
Remember that Mr. Hasratian opened his claim for unemployment
insurance benefits before his employer had agreed to continue paying him wages for
one more week and before he had received a Claimant Guide. And recall that Mr.
Hasratian considered his employer's decision to continue paying him his wages for
another week as a courtesy and not as payment of severance pay, so when the
Department claims taker asked Mr. Hasratian: "Have you received or are you entitled
to receive vacation or severance pay?," Mr. Hasratian answered "No." R. at 002.
That was a statement which, at the time, was entirely truthful on the part of Mr.
Hasratian. The Department points to no evidence, much less clear and convincing
evidence, that at the time Mr. Hasratian opened his claim, he had received severance
pay or that he had some entitlement to receive severance pay at some point in the
future.
The issue is: what was Mr. Hasratian's state of knowledge, what was
the state of mind at the precise moment he made his representation to the Department,
before he received the Claimant Guide?
The sequence of events is critical. The facts are that when Mr.
Hasratian opened his claim and made his representations to the Department, he did so
before he had received the Claimant Guide which arguably put him on notice that the
4
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Department would consider the wages his employer was agreeing to continue paying
him for another week to be severance pay and reportable. R. at 107-108.
Thus, when Mr. Hasratian opened his claim and made the
representations he made, he made representations which were truthful at the time. He
didn't have the level of knowledge he needed in order to make a knowing
misrepresentation/omission.
The Department argues that it does not have to prove that a claimant
had a specific intent to defraud, citing to Mineer v. Board of Review, 572 P.2d 1364
(Utah 1977). See also Utah Administrative Code R994-406-401 (1) and R994-406402 (2). Mr. Hasratian has no argument with such a proposition. The Department
does not have to prove scienter in the criminal sense. But the Department cannot
presume fraud. It has to prove it. And it has to prove it by clear and convincing
evidence. See Utah Administrative Code R994-406-401 (1). The Department does
have to show some element of knowledge or wilfulness-the submission of a claim
knowingly containing false material statements or material omissions. And the
Department failed to do so.
The timing of events is fatal to the Department's arguments. After Mr.
Hasratian made his proposal to his employer that his employer pay him severance pay,
he then opened his claim. R. at 105-106. At the time, he didn't have an answer back
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from his employer. R. at 106. And, then, after Mr. Hasratian had opened his claim,
his employer rejected Mr. Hasratian's proposal to pay him severance pay, but agreed
to continue paying Mr. Hasratian his wages for one more week. R. at 106. And then
Mr. Hasratian received the Claimant Guide. R. at 107-108.
A.

THE ELEMENT OF MATERIALITY. MR. HASRATIAN DID

NOT FAIL TO PROVIDE ACCURATE AND TRUTHFUL INFORMATION TO
THE DEPARTMENT.
The Department attempts to argue that the evidence establishes intent to
defraud by arguing that Mr. Hasratian intentionally failed to provide accurate
information concerning his employer's decision to continue paying him wages for
one more week to the Department. (Respondent's brief at 11.)
The problem with the Department's argument is that it has the sequence
of events wrong. The Department argues that when, on January 24, 2011, Mr.
Hasratian opened his claim and the Department representative asked Mr. Hasratian if
he was entitled to receive severance pay and Mr. Hasratian replied, "No," such a
representation was false because Mr. Hasratian was in negotiations with the employer
regarding a possible severance agreement. However, it hardly follows that being
involved in negotiations equates with submission of false information. At the time
Mr. Hasratian was asked and answered the Department's inquiry, Mr. Hasratian's
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employer had not made a decision, R. at 106, and had not paid Mr. Hasratian any
severance pay. At that time, Mr. Hasratian had not received any severance pay and
Mr. Hasratian was not yet entitled to receive any severance pay. R. at 102. Thus, the
Department's arguments as to material falsity is contrary to Utah Administrative Code
Rule 994-405-702 (1) (b) and is not supported by substantial evidence.
After Mr. Hasratian opened his claim, Mr. Hasratian's employer
rejected Mr. Hasratian's proposal have it pay Mr. Hasratian severance pay but did
agree to continue paying him his wages through January 28, 2011. R. at 106. When
Mr. Hasratian's employer agreed to do so, the employer didn't call it severance pay.
R. at 106. Mr. Hasratian didn't consider it to be severance pay. R. at 107. And Mr.
Hasratian had not yet received the Claimant Guide. Thus, at the time he opened the
claim, there was no false representation.
The Department's strongest argument is probably that after Mr.
Hasratian opened his claim and after Mr. Hasratian's employer agreed to continue
paying Mr. Hasratian his wages for one more week and after Mr. Hasratian received
the Claimant Guide and either read it or should be charged with knowledge of its
contents, Mr. Hasratian failed at that point to contact the Department to inform the
Department that his employer had agreed to continue paying him his wages for one
more week. (Respondent's brief at page 12.) But, again, whether Mr. Hasratian's

7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

failure to contact the Department to inform it that his employer was paying him
severance pay depends on whether Mr. Hasratian understood the employer's decision
to continue paying him his wages for one more week to be payment of severance pay.
If Mr. Hasratian's employer didn't consider such to constitute severance pay and Mr.
Hasratian didn't consider such to constitute severance pay (and he didn't, R. at 102),
Mr. Hasratian may be mistaken, but he would lack the capacity to make a false
statement or to omit material information. And that is exactly what happened. Mr.
Hasratian asked for severance pay. And his employer rejected Mr. Hasratian's
proposal.
The Department's decision that Mr. Hasratian made representations
which were false or failed to provide material information so as to leave a false
impression is based on a mere presumption and contrary to the facts as to Mr.
Hasratian's state of understanding. Therefore, the Department's decision on the
element of materiality is not supported by substantial evidence.
B.

THE ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE. MR. HASRATIAN DID

NOT KNOW. OR HAVE REASON TO KNOW. THAT THE INFORMATION HE
WAS SUBMITTING TO THE DEPARTMENT WAS FALSE.
Secondly, the Department argues that after Mr. Hasratian provided the
information he provided to the Department, he became aware or should have realized
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that such information that he had previously provided was now inaccurate or
incomplete and his failure to correct such information was reckless. (Respondent's
brief at page 12).
The Department's arguments are not supported by substantial evidence.
Assuming that when Mr. Hasratian opened his claim, Mr. Hasratian
knew that there was a possibility that he might receive some type of pay in the future
which the Department might deem to constitute a payment of severance pay (a
proposition which the Department did not prove), such would not equate to Mr.
Hasratian's representations to the Department being knowing or reckless. The claim
taker's question to Mr. Hasratian was not whether there was a possibility he might
receive severance pay. It was whether he had received or was going to receive
severance pay. Mr. Hasratian's answers to such questions were completely truthful.
Similarly, the Department's effort to argue that Mr. Hasratian's effort to
persuade the employer to pay him some severance pay (which the employer
completely rejected) somehow transformed itself into a claim to an entitlement on the
part of Mr. Hasratian to severance pay, is unavailing. (Respondent's brief at page
13.) The fact that Mr. Hasratian, as a layman, makes a proposal to an employer
hardly supports a conclusion that he personally considered himself entitled to a
payment of severance pay. R. at 102. Indeed, the evidence supports quite the
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opposite conclusion, that Mr. Hasratian knew he had no contractual right to any
severance pay, but was appealing to his employer's sense of fairness-hardly the type
of sure thing which would lead a claimant to conclude that he should tell the
Department's caseworker that he was entitled to severance pay. R. at 102.
The Department returns to more sure footing when it argues that after
Mr. Hasratian received the Claimant's Guide, Mr. Hasratian's receipt of the Claimant
Guide should have put Mr. Hasratian on notice that his previously truthful
representation to the Department needed to be amended. But the Department needed
to prove that Mr. Hasratian's failure to do so was knowing or reckless by clear and
convincing evidence. And this it failed to do.
The Department's argument in this regard suffers from two defects.
First, it ignores the timing and sequence of events. Mr. Hasratian made the
representations that he had not received any severance pay and was not entitled to
receive any severance pay (both true at the time) before the Department sent Mr.
Hasratian the Claimant Guide. R. at 107-108. So, the most the Department can argue
is that Mr. Hasratian's receipt of the Claimant Guide should have put Mr. Hasratian
on notice that he had some type of enforceable obligation to contact the Department
and inform them that after he had made his first (and truthful) representations to the
Department, things had changed so he needed to let the Department know that his
10
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employer had agreed to pay him one more week of wages so as to "set the record
straight."
It is undisputed that Mr. Hasratian did not do so. Does that failure
supply the element of knowledge or recklessness? And did the Department prove
such by clear and convincing evidence?
Posing such questions highlights the second problem with the
Department's argument, which is that Mr. Hasratian viewed the employer's decision
to pay him his wages for one more week as a courtesy, not as payment of severance
pay. R. At 102. It is now clear that Mr. Hasratian was wrong about that because the
Claimant Guide arguably put him on notice that the Department would consider any
payment of any kind from his employer to be severance pay. But the issue is not
whether he was wrong, it is whether at the time he received the Claimant Guide, he
realized he had been wrong or should have realized that he had been wrong. And the
Department points to no evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence, to
support its argument.
The Claimant Guide doesn't specifically address the issue of
continuation of pay. It speaks in terms of work and earnings. And it is undisputed
that Mr. Hasratian did not work during the week of January 22nd to 29th. The
Department notes that if the Claimant was unsure about how to categorize his
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employer's decision to pay him wages for one more week, he could simply have
contacted the Department for clarification. While that may be true, the Department's
argument misses the point. If Mr. Hasratian was unsure, or even mistaken as to the
legal significance of this additional week of wages, he would lack the requisite
knowledge or recklessness to satisfy this element of the administrative fraud statute.
The Department's decision that Mr. Hasratian's actions in failing to go
back and provide further information to the Department were knowing or reckless is
not supported by substantial evidence.
C.

THE ELEMENT OF WILFULNESS. When he opened his

claim, Mr. Hasratian truthfully reported to the Department that he was not entitled to
severance pay. And, later, when his employer agreed to continue to pay him
severance pay for one more week, he did not wilfully conceal such fact that he had
received wages for one more week.
The Department cites a litany of cases that equates the submission of a
claim containing false statements or omitting material information to submission of
information with the intent to defraud. (See Respondent's brief at page 15.)
Mr. Hasratian does not challenge the holding of such cases.2 What he

2

Although how such "inherent" intent to defraud squares with an obligation to
prove intent to defraud by clear and convincing evidence (which means that "fraud may
not be presumed") is unclear.
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challenges is the Department's argument that when he submitted his claim for
unemployment insurance benefits, such contained false statements or material
omissions.
When Mr. Hasratian opened his claim, he hadn't received any severance
pay and was not entitled to receive any severance pay. His representations to the
Department were truthful. There was nothing false about his representations to the
Department. And he didn't omit to disclose material information.
The Department's only possible meritorious argument is that after Mr.
Hasratian opened his claim, and after his employer agreed to continue paying him his
wages for one more week, and after he received the Claimant Guide, he should have
realized that he was, in reality, receiving something which the Department would
consider severance pay and had an affirmative obligation to contact the Department
and inform the Department that his receipt of pay for an additional week really was
severance pay and that his failure to do so was wilful-namely, a manifestation of a
desire to engage in conduct which would cause the result of not interrupting his
receipt of unemployment insurance benefits.
The problem for the Department is that it had to prove that Mr.
Hasratian's conduct was wilful by clear and convincing evidence and it failed to do
so. In this regard, the Department argues for a kind of strict liability. But the test is

13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not strict liability; the test is whether Mr. Hasratian knew, or should have known, that
the Department would deem his employer's decision to continue paying him his
wages for one more week as payment of severance pay and that he, therefore, had the
obligation to contact the Department and explain to the Department that even though
his employer had rejected his request to pay him severance pay, it was, nevertheless,
paying him severance pay.
If Mr. Hasratian did not think this payment of wages for one more week
was severance pay, he may have been wrong, but he could not have deliberately and
purposefully chosen to hide such a fact from the Department. R. at 102. The
Department's decision supporting the element of wilfulness is not supported by
substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
The parties do not dispute that after Mr. Hasratian opened his claim and
after his employer decided to continue paying him his wages for one more week, Mr.
Hasratian failed to report the same to the Department. Mr. Hasratian agrees that such
failure resulted in an overpayment which he is obligated to pay back. Where the
parties differ is whether that failure supports a conclusion of administrative fraud
under Utah Code § 35A-4-405 (5) and Utah Administrative Code Rule 994-406-401.
In order to prove that point, the Department had the burden of proving
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each of the elements of fraud-materiality, knowledge and wilfulness-by clear and
convincing evidence. The evidence, however, establishes that when Mr. Hasratian
opened his claim, he answered the claim taker's questions in a truthful manner. He
had not received severance pay. He was not entitled to receive a severance payment.
He answered that he had not received severance pay and was not entitled to receive a
severance payment. At the time, both statements were true. There was no false
representation or material omission.
A week or 10 days or so later, after his employer had agreed to continue
paying him his wages for one more week and after Mr. Hasratian had received the
Claimant Guide, Mr. Hasratian could have affirmatively contacted the Department,
but did not do so. Was that a wilful failure/a material omission he was obligated to
correct?
The evidence established that Mr. Hasratian did not do so because he
did not view his employer's decision to continue paying him wages for one more
week as payment of severance pay. R. at 102. Mr. Hasratian was wrong about that.
See Utah Administrative Code Rule 994-405-702 (1) (b). But did he know he was
wrong? What the Department had to prove was that Mr. Hasratian was not only
wrong, but and that he knew he was wrong, or should have known he was wrong.
The Department's evidence fell short of proving such subjective state of mind on the
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part of Mr. Hasratian by clear and convincing evidence.
Mr. Hasratian is not asking for the Court to read the element of scienter
into this statute. But he is asking for clear and convincing proof that when Mr.
Hasratian made his representations to the Department, he made representations which
were false or that he omitted material information. The Department's evidence does
not support that conclusion. Mr. Hasratian is also asking for clear and convincing
proof that after his employer rejected his proposal to pay him any severance pay but
agreed to continue paying him his wages for one more week and after he received the
Claimant Guide, he knew or should have known that his employer's decision to pay
him his wages for one more week was, nevertheless, despite his employer's
characterization as such as a courtesy and Mr. Hasratian's subjective understanding of
such as not being severance pay, payment of severance pay and that he needed to
contact the Department and inform the Department and that he intentionally decided
to not do so as to continue receiving unemployment insurance benefits. The
Department's evidence does not support that conclusion by clear and convincing
evidence, by a preponderance of the evidence or by substantial evidence.
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11. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Please complete one of the sections:
Section 1. Word Count
As required by Fed.R.App.P.32 (a) (7) ©), I certify that this brief is proportionally
spaced and contains

4,227

words.

Complete one of the following:
X

I relied on my word processor to obtain the count and it is:
WordPerfect 8

Corel

.

I counted five characters per word, counting all characters, including citations
and numerals.
Section 2. Line count
My brief was prepared in a monospaced typeface and contains

lines of

text.
I certify that the information that the information on this form is true and correct to
the best of my knowledge and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry.

COC-1 Certificate of Compliance - 11/98

17
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12. CERTIFICATE OF DIGITAL SUBMISSION
AND PRIVACY REDACTIONS
I hereby certify that a copy of the previously filed APPELLANT'S
REPLY BRIEF, as submitted in Digital Form via the Court's ECF system, is an exact
copy of the written document filed with the Clerk and has been scanned for viruses
with Norton Antivirus, YahooMail, and, according to the program, is free of viruses.
In addition, I certify all required privacy redactions have been made.

Alison Holladay
Legal Assistant

/s/ Alison Holladay
Legal Assistant (Digital)

i
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this / |^day of July, 2012, two true, correct and
complete copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF were delivered
upon the attorney(s) indicated below by the following method(s); and that the original
and seven copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF were delivered to
Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, P.O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, UT
84114-0230, by the following method(s):
Facsimile
'U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
E-Mail
Electronic Filing
Amanda B. McPeck, Esq.
Workforce Appeals Board
Department of Workforce Services
Division of Adjudication
P.O. Box 45244
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0244
Hyke A. Hasratian
2538 North 275 East
North Ogden,UT 84414

David J. Holtisworth^/
9125 South MMroePlaza Way, Suite C
Sandy UT 84070
Telephone: (801) 352-7701
Fax:(801)567-9960
E-Mail: david holdsworth@hotmail.com
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